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Abstract 
The legislative consent convention forms one of a number of conventions that 
underpin the UK’s uncodified constitution and has been an important facet of the 
UK’s territorial governance, post-devolution. It provides that the UK Government 
will not normally seek to legislate on devolved matters, and the devolution 
settlements, without the consent of the respective devolved legislatures. Commonly 
referred to as the ‘Sewel convention’, the convention’s roots are often traced to the 
commitments made by Lord Sewel during the passage of the Scotland Act 1998. 
 
This article demonstrates, however, that the convention has a far deeper history 
that long predated Lord Sewel’s comments at the despatch box in 1998. Rather, the 
convention goes back to the dawn of devolution in the United Kingdom: namely, the 
Northern Ireland Parliament that existed between 1921 and 1972. This paper charts 
the development of the legislative consent convention from its roots in the 
unwillingness of the UK Government  to directly challenge the Northern Ireland 
Government over local government franchise reform in 1921, to its continued 
survival, even when Stormont collapsed in 1972 and argues that the convention’s 
survived due to its role as a device of convenience and pragmatism for politicians in 
Westminster.  
Keywords: Devolution, constitutional history, intergovernmental relations, 
interparliamentary relations, Brexit 
Introduction: the ‘Sewel Convention’? 
 
The legislative consent convention forms one of a number of conventions 
underpinning the UK’s uncodified constitution and is a central pillar of devolution in 
the United Kingdom. The convention is more commonly referred to as the ‘Sewel 
convention’ as its origins are often ascribed to the comments made by Lord Sewel 
when guiding the Scotland Bill through the House of Lords in 1998.i Sewel, then a 
Junior Scottish Office Minister, explained to Peers that the Government expected “a 
convention to be established that Westminster would not normally legislate with 
regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish 
Parliament”.ii  
 
This commitment, that the Government would not normally legislate on devolved 
matters without the consent of the devolved legislature affected, has been enshrined 
in the Memorandums of Understanding between the UK and devolved Governments 
and Devolution Guidance Notes (DGNs) (produced by the UK Government to assist 
civil servants in dealing with devolution issues). As Cowie explains, the DGNs also 
assumed a broader interpretation of the legislative consent convention, namely that 
consent would also be sought where the UK Parliament sought to alter the legislative 
and/or executive competence of the devolved institutions.iii  
 
Amidst the drama of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, the Sewel 
Convention has become a matter of controversy. During R v Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union (‘the Miller case’), for example, the Scottish and Welsh 
Governments intervened to argue that, if an Act of Parliament was needed for an 
Article 50 notification to take place, the consent of the Scottish and Welsh devolved 
legislatures was required. The Supreme Court, in its judgement, ruled that the 
Convention was a political convention, notwithstanding s.2 of the Scotland Act 2016 
and Wales Act 2017, and was not justiciable.iv  Since then, the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 was passed by the UK Parliament despite consent being 
refused in Holyrood, marking only the second time that a legislative consent motion 
had been denied by the Scottish Parliament since devolution.  
 
This article looks at the roots of the legislative consent convention in the UK’s 
territorial constitution. It demonstrates that the convention has a far deeper history 
that long predated the comments of Lord Sewel at the despatch box in 1998 and 
traces the convention’s roots back to the first few months of the UK’s much earlier 
experiment in legislative devolution: the Parliament and Government of Northern 
Ireland (also referred collectively in this paper as ‘Stormont’), established in 1921 and 
which existed until 1972. The article explains how the convention developed, and the 
forces that helped entrench it as a principle of territorial management, even after the 
suspension of Stormont in 1972. 
 
Northern Ireland and the origins of the ‘Sewel’ convention 
 
The establishment of a convention 
 
Whilst the ‘Sewel convention’ takes its name from the comments made by Lord Sewel 
in 1998 its origins stretch back to the beginning of the devolution experiment in the 
United Kingdom, namely the devolved Parliament and Government in Northern 
Ireland that existed from 1921 until its prorogation in 1972. Indeed, Lord Sewel 
prefaced his remarks in 1998 by saying that he expected a legislative consent 
convention to be established after Scottish devolution “as happened in Northern 
Ireland earlier in the century”.v The rest of this article will focus on how the original 
legislative consent convention developed in the context of Northern Ireland and how 
the ‘Sewel’ articulation can be seen as a continuation of this earlier legislative consent 
convention. 
 
The origins of the legislative consent convention lie in a dispute that occurred during 
the earliest days of devolution in Northern Ireland. In the summer of 1922, Stormont 
MPs had passed legislation replacing the pre-partition and pre-devolution electoral 
system for local government elections (proportional representation) with the first 
past the post system used in Great Britain. This reform, passed through the Northern 
Ireland Parliament in the midst of the Irish Civil War and intense discussions 
between London and Dublin on legislating for the Irish Free State constitution, 
sparked outrage amongst nationalist leaders and prompted complaints from Michael 
Collins and, after Collins’ death, W.T. Cosgrave, that the Bill was contrary to the 
spirit of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.vi As a result, Royal Assent for the Bill was reserved 
and the final decision on whether to give Assent or not was put to the Cabinet at a 
meeting of the British signatories to the Treaty with Ireland on 7 September 1922.  
 
The decision to reserve forwarding the Bill for Royal Assent prompted fierce protests 
from the Unionist Government in Northern Ireland. On 22 July, Sir James Craig, the 
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, wrote to Sir James Masterton-Smith, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, to warn the Government to: 
Consider the effect of the British Government withholding Royal Assent to a 
Bill dealing with purely local affairs and certified, as is required under the 
Regulations, by the Attorney General to be within the terms of the 
Government of Ireland Act 1920.vii 
The effect, Craig advised, would be that he would collapse his administration and 
possibly even the delicate system of devolved government in Northern Ireland 
altogether. According to Craig, “no Government could carry on in Northern Ireland if 
it knows that the powers of the Parliament (of Northern Ireland) […] were to be 
abrogated”.viii 
 
This threat was reiterated by Craig, in a letter to Winston Churchill, the then 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, on 1 September. Craig, who had been invited to 
the crucial UK cabinet meeting on 7 September, warned Churchill that the Northern 
Ireland cabinet had met and decided unanimously that “it would be impossible to 
carry on if legislation passed by the Commons and Senate admittedly within the 
powers conferred by the Government of Ireland Act 1920 were to be vetoed”.ix 
 
Craig’s threats were clearly effective. On 7 September, the British signatories of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty met to consider the fate of the controversial Bill. While the 
Government of Ireland Act 1920 had transferred responsibility for local government 
to Stormont, Section 75 of the Act expressly stressed the continuing sovereignty of 
the UK Parliament, stating that the supreme authority of Westminster “shall remain 
unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters, and things in Ireland and 
every part thereof”.x Nonetheless, the minutes of that meeting demonstrate a clear 
feeling that the UK Government could not exercise said sovereignty to block 
Stormont. Austen Chamberlain, the Lord Privy Seal, warned, for example, that 
blocking the Bill would “be straining our prerogative”, while the Prime Minister, 
David Lloyd George, also accepted that the Bill could not be vetoed, despite it being a 
“breach of the spirit of the Treaty as regards the protection of minorities”. Instead, he 
expressed hope that Sir James Craig could be persuaded to delay the Bill’s 
implementation until the Free State constitution had passed through Westminster 
and the Dáil.xi 
 
Craig, for his part, criticised the lack of warning as to the toxicity of the Bill in the 
context of the Free State constitution discussions. He told the Cabinet members 
present that “had he been warned in time he would have done his best to postpone 
the measure”. While he promised to postpone some of the local elections (and thus 
the impact of the reforms), he was insistent that the Bill could not be held back.  
 
Craig’s threat to bring down devolution in Stormont was successful, Royal Assent 
being given to the Bill on 12 September 1922 and in retrospect it can be argued to 
represent a key moment in relations between the UK and Northern Ireland 
governments and in the centre’s understanding of its room for manoeuvre in relation 
to devolved matters in Northern Ireland. By refusing to withhold Royal Assent on 
this measure, despite the concerns of members of both the Irish Free State and UK 
Cabinets as to its implications, the Lloyd George coalition Government essentially 
accepted Chamberlain’s claim that using s.75 of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 
to intervene in devolved matters and to assert continued parliamentary sovereignty 
would be “straining our prerogative”. xii 
 
In this episode we therefore see the birth of what would become a near fifty-year 
convention whereby Whitehall and Westminster would not unilaterally intervene in 
Stormont’s affairs and would only legislate on devolved matters at Stormont’s 
request. –This understanding, which would develop into the legislative consent 
convention (including not only a non-interference limb, but also a legislate on 
devolved matters only at the request, or with the approval, of the devolved 
institutions limb), was not just an intergovernmental affair, however, and was able to 
develop due to the rulings of Speakers of the House of Commons.  
 
In May 1923, Frank Gray MP sought a ruling from Speaker Whiteley as to “whether 
Members of this House are entitled to put questions to the Prime Minister or the 
Home Secretary with reference to the conduct of proceedings in Northern Ireland”.xiii 
The following day, Gray repeated this request, noting that despite the powers 
devolved to the Northern Ireland Parliament by the Government of Ireland Act 1920: 
Northern Ireland has representation in this House; secondly, that powers are 
reserved to this country under the provisions of the Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920: thirdly, that monies are voted by this House to defray in whole or in 
part the expenses of services transferred to Northern Ireland, and, fourthly, 
that there is reserved the power of taxation and an interest in the profits of 
taxation in Northern Ireland for the benefit of the Consolidated Fund.xiv   
In response, Speaker Whiteley ruled that “with regard to those subjects which have 
been delegated to the Government of Northern Ireland, questions must be asked of 
Ministers in Northern Ireland, and not in this House” – this ruling would prove 
particularly significant in entrenching the legislative consent convention and the 
attitude that, notwithstanding parliamentary sovereignty, Westminster and 
Whitehall could not intervene in devolved matters.xv Indeed, as Bogdanor has 
previously highlighted, this convention and attitude was so entrenched that Sir Ivor 
Jennings, the doyen of British and commonwealth constitutional law and history, 
argued that it would be “unconstitutional” for Westminster to legislate on devolved 
matters in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Parliament and government in 
Stormont.xvi    
 
The convention under strain 
 
This era of non-intervention in Northern Ireland came under strain during the 
1960s. This decade would culminate in mass protests from a fledgling civil rights 
movement in the province, riots and the beginning of ‘The Troubles’, it would result 
in the Stormont system facing the fiercest criticism and scrutiny that it had 
encountered to date from MPs in Westminster and, by 1972, would end in the 
system’s collapse and replacement by direct rule by Westminster. 
 
Among the first to raise attention to Northern Ireland in Westminster in the early 
1960s was the Labour MP, Paul Rose. In his memoirs, Backbencher’s dilemma, Rose 
described a “blank wall of incomprehension and ignorance about Ulster”, suggesting 
a House of Commons in the early 1960s where “Members who knew about Saigon or 
Salisbury seemed to know nothing of Stormont”, a situation that was buttressed by a 
“Parliamentary convention, erected into holy writ by Speaker after Speaker, that 
prevented us raising matters of real substance on the floor of the House without 
being ruled out of order”.xvii  
 
Rose’s account of this period clearly paints a picture of the legislative consent/non-
intervention convention as a tool of convenience for those in Westminster and in 
Whitehall who did not want to get embroiled in Northern Ireland affairs. He 
described a “fear of getting too involved” with Sir Frank Soskice and other Home 
Secretaries (the Home Secretary also held responsibility for Northern Ireland 
matters within the Cabinet) accused, by Rose, of having hidden “behind the 
conventions of the Government of Ireland Act”.xviii  
 
Indeed, one striking example of these conventions in play can be seen in a debate on 
Northern Ireland affairs held on 14 July 1964. Eric Lubbock, Liberal MP for 
Orpington, used the debate to raise cases of religious discrimination and 
gerrymandering of local government boundaries, only to be then interrupted by the 
Deputy Speaker who warned that it was out of order to raise local government 
boundaries in Northern Ireland which were “a matter for the Northern Ireland 
Government and nothing to do with the Government here”.xix  
 
Winding up the debate, the then Home Secretary, Henry Brooke MP bemoaned 
allegations of religious discrimination in Northern Ireland, suggesting that “that 
there are more urgent matters to discuss”.  While Brooke acknowledged that any 
discriminatory legislation or actions by the Parliament or Government of Northern 
Ireland could be challenged, under sections 5 and 8(6) of the Government of Ireland 
Act (which provided that neither body could make a law or exercise executive power 
of a discriminatory kind on account of religion), he also claimed that the UK 
Governments hands were bound by convention: 
But it has been held by successive Governments in the United Kingdom, 
regardless of party, that the reserve powers in the Government of Ireland Act 
do not enable the United Kingdom Government to intervene in matters which, 
under Section 4, are the sole responsibility of the Northern Ireland Parliament 
and Government.xx 
It is perhaps little wonder, then, that when reflecting in his memoirs on the 
escalation of the situation in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, Denis Healey 
lamented the “generations of inexcusable neglect” that had resulted in a lack of 
knowledge about the paramilitary organisations on both the loyalist and nationalist 
sides and “lamentably poor communications between Whitehall and Stormont”.xxi 
Indeed, K.O. Morgan, in his biography of James Callaghan, noted that when 
Callaghan became Home Secretary in 1968  “there were no policy briefings, and no 
boxes whatsoever on how to handle Northern Irish affairs”.xxii 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the generations of inexcusable neglect, the situation 
by the late 1960s had escalated alarmingly for both the UK and Northern Irish 
Governments. So much so that by late 1968, the UK Government threatened to 
impose reform on Stormont if the latter could not make the reforms necessary to 
redress the grievances of the nationalist community in the province. On 4 November 
1968, the UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson summoned Terence O’Neill (the then 
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland) and other senior Stormont ministers to 
Downing Street to discuss the situation in Northern Ireland.xxiii 
 
At this meeting Wilson expressed the “great concern at Westminster over many 
aspects of the Northern Ireland scene” and highlighted “a number of Northern 
Ireland matters that the United Kingdom Government found irksome, including the 
Londonderry situation and the Local Government franchise”. Whilst emphasizing the 
UK’s “residual responsibility” for devolved matters under s.75 of the Government of 
Ireland Act, Wilson nonetheless warned that the Government “did not need to get 
involved in a constitutional crisis in order to exert its will on Northern Ireland, but 
could have recourse to other possibilities”. Such possibilities included the generous 
financial contributions made to Stormont by the UK Government and Parliament, 
contributions that were “of a discretionary nature” and “would clearly be at risk in 
any situation in which the United Kingdom Government needed to bring pressure to 
bear”.xxiv 
 
As an added inducement, James Callaghan, the Home Secretary, cautioned the 
Stormont delegation that pressures at Westminster for action “were increasing […] 
[and] clearly about to grow on a massive scale while in Northern Ireland the risk of 
some escalation in violence had to be faced”. He therefore suggested that both 
Governments shared a “common interest in achieving reform fast”, otherwise the 
situation would deteriorate further. 
 
Notwithstanding the Prime Minister and Home Secretary’s overtures, the minutes of 
the subsequent meeting of the Northern Ireland cabinet, on 2o November 1968, 
demonstrate, at least among some ministers, a continued belief that they were 
immune from Westminster interference. The minutes record the Ministers of 
Commerce, Education and Agriculture all expressing the view that the Government 
“could not be expected to act on the franchise issue under duress”, while William 
Craig, the Minister for Home Affairs went further, describing s. 75 as a “mere reserve 
power, which it would be quite unconstitutional to exercise” against the Stormont 
institutions. This position was rejected by the Northern Ireland Attorney General 
who warned that s.75 “meant what is said, which was that Westminster retained its 
powers to legislate in all matters, including those ‘transferred’” and, importantly, that 
“conventional practice should not be confused with legal power”. xxv 
 
Intervention, survival and re-emergence 
 
By early 1972 the situation in Northern Ireland had deteriorated to the extent that 
direct intervention in Stormont’s affairs had migrated from a theoretical possibility 
to a political imperative. On 30 January 1972, 28 unarmed civilians would be shot, of 
which fourteen died, by the British Army in what became known as Bloody Sunday. 
This sparked a rapid series of political developments. On  4 February 1972, the UK 
and Northern Irish Governments met to discuss the political and security situation in 
Northern Ireland. At this meeting, the UK Ministers floated a number of suggestions 
ranging from varying the border and exchanging populations to a referendum on the 
future status of Northern Ireland (which would become known as a border poll) and 
transferring law and order powers from Stormont to Westminster.  
 
Edward Heath, the then UK Prime Minister, noted that this was now the policy of the 
official opposition at Westminster and he pondered what the arguments against this 
proposal would be. In response, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Brian 
Faulkner cautioned that such a move would be “in substance direct rule” and would 
reduce the Government of Northern Ireland to “a sham”. Warning the UK 
Government against such a course, Faulkner threatened that “if this transfer of 
powers were proposed, he would call for withdrawal or direct rule” and that the basis 
of such a proposal would be “that a Northern Ireland Government could not be 
trusted”.xxvi 
 
Despite Faulkner’s objections, a month later the UK Government had decided that 
enough was enough. At a meeting on 22 March, Heath advised Faulkner that it was 
his Government’s view that Westminster should take over responsibility for law and 
order, other proposals included the border poll floated in the February meeting, as 
well as the appointment of a Secretary of State with responsibility for Northern 
Ireland affairs.xxvii These proposals fell on predictably stony ground. Faulkner 
reiterated his threat that the Northern Ireland Government could not accept the 
transfer of law and order powers from Stormont. The next day, at a meeting of the 
Northern Ireland cabinet, Ministers endorsed this position and threatened the 
resignation of the Government.xxviii 
 
It is an irony that the fifty-year existence of a devolved Government and Parliament 
in Northern Ireland was book-ended by threats from Northern Irish Prime Ministers 
to collapse their Governments in the face of threatened interference from 
Westminster and Whitehall. However, while the first threat, by Sir James Craig, was 
successful and played a key role in establishing a convention that was as much about 
non-interference as it was about legislative consent, the second threat, by Brian 
Faulkner, would prove futile.  
 
On 24 March 1972, Edward Heath announced to the House of Commons that despite 
the threats to resign from the Northern Ireland Government, the UK Government 
remained of the view “that the transfer of this responsibility to Westminster is an 
indispensable condition for progress in finding a political solution in Northern 
Ireland”. As a result, the UK Parliament would be invited to pass before Easter a 
Measure transferring all legislative and executive powers currently invested in the 
Northern Ireland Parliament and Government to the United Kingdom Parliament 
and Government. The provision would expire after one year unless otherwise decided 
by Parliament and  the Parliament of Northern Ireland “would stand prorogued but 
would not be dissolved”.xxix Shortly afterwards, Westminster passed the Northern 
Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972.  
 
While this marked the ultimate breach of the legislative consent convention that had 
been established after 1922, it did not mean that the convention was entirely dead or 
indeed disavowed. In its 1972 Green Paper, The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper 
for Discussion, the Heath Government reflected on the development and rationale 
for the legislative consent convention. According to the Green Paper, the legislative 
consent convention developed as a pragmatic view that, having establish devolved 
institutions in Northern Ireland, Westminster “should not lightly supersede or 
override those powers”.xxx 
 
This argument was echoed, a year later when the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, initially established in 1969 in response to a surge in support for the 
SNP and Plaid Cymru in parliamentary by-elections, finally reported. The Royal 
Commission’s majority report noted that although the subordinate status of the 
Northern Ireland institutions vis-à-vis Westminster had always been clear, “in 
practice […] the United Kingdom Parliament had refrained from legislating for the 
province on matters with which the Northern Ireland Parliament could deal, except 
at the request and with the agreement of the Government of Northern Ireland”. This 
legislative consent convention had developed, according to the report, as a 
recognition that “any departure from this practice would undermine the authority of 
the Northern Ireland Government”.xxxi 
 
The Commission’s majority report acknowledged that under a future scheme of 
devolution the Government could seek to adopt a different approach and to be more 
assertive regarding the devolved institutions and be more prescriptive in setting out 
how such bodies could use their powers; such a scheme would not be in keeping with 
their conception of legislative devolution. Instead, the majority report conceived 
legislative devolution on generous lines with restrictions on their powers limited to 
abiding by the rule of law and international legal obligations. Under this model, 
while Parliamentary sovereignty would remain intact, “there would be a convention 
that those powers would not ordinarily be used to legislate on a transferred matter 
without the consent of the region”.  
 
While Parliament would retain the power to legislate for devolved matters, even 
when consent was withheld, or to veto devolved legislation, these powers “would in 
practice have to be regarded as a weapon of last resort”. As the majority report goes 
on to note, “frequent recourse to either of them [legislating contrary to the devolved 
institutions wishes or vetoing devolved legislation] would be bound to undermine 
regional autonomy and the smooth working relationship between central and 
regional authorities which would be essential to good government”. The legislative 




In actually existing form, or just in principle, the idea of a legislative consent 
convention is as old as devolution itself in the United Kingdom. Lord Sewel’s famous 
comment during the passage of the Scotland Act 1998 acknowledged the lineage of a 
legislative consent convention, yet it is arguably the case that this pre-history has not 
been readily engaged with by scholars of the UK’s territorial constitution post the 
reforms of the Blair era. 
 
The legislative consent convention emerged from a mixture of an unwillingness by 
the Lloyd George coalition Government to assert Westminster’s sovereignty in the 
face of the threat to collapse Stormont in its infancy from Sir James Craig to a more 
general desire at the centre to leave Northern Ireland matters to the province’s 
devolved institutions. The latter arguably reflecting a desire among many in 
Westminster and Whitehall to avoid being tangled in Northern Irish matters after 
nearly half a century of prolonged debate on the Irish question. 
 
The convention, as it emerged from those early days, was a tool of both political and 
administrative convenience and consisted of two pillars: 1) non-interference in 
matters that were transferred by the Government of Ireland Act 1920; and 2) only 
legislating for transferred matters at the invitation, or with the consent, of the 
Northern Ireland Parliament and Government. The first pillar of this convention led 
to what Denis Healey termed “generations of inexcusable neglect” of Northern 
Ireland by the centre, a state of play that collapsed in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
as the situation in Northern Ireland became increasingly unstable and dangerous.   
 
The second pillar is more recognisable to scholars of devolution post-1997 and, cast 
by the UK Government in its 1972 Green Paper and the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution’s majority report, as a pragmatic and convenient approach to territorial 
management, ultimately survived the suspension of the Northern Ireland Parliament 
in 1972 and, after a prolonged period of hibernation between 1972 and 1998, re-
emerged to become a central pillar of devolution in the United Kingdom.  
 
In this latest incarnation, the legislative consent convention has once more been a 
device of convenience and pragmatism. The convention and its apparatus, including 
legislative consent motions, have proven useful in enabling Westminster to legislate 
in devolved spheres when such legislation has been to the convenience of the 
devolved legislatures and Governments (as the Institute for Government has shown, 
between 1998 and May 2018, there had been 340 LCMs: of which 173 LCMs were 
voted on in the Scottish Parliament) and have been utilised effectively by devolved 
governments when seeking to negotiate concessions from Westminster. xxxiii   
 
The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union raises a number of questions that are 
fundamental to the country’s territorial constitution and to the balance of power 
between the UK and the devolved institutions with a potentially large increase in the 
number of competencies where responsibilities fall within the ambit of the UK and 
devolved governments. The controversy that surrounds the Brexit process may make 
managing these shared interests, itself a complex task, more difficult and in doing so 
could bring into question the near century old foundations of the legislative consent 
convention: namely that non-intervention by Westminster in devolved matters, 
except where consent is provided or where intervention is requested, is both a 
pragmatic and convenient approach to the management of the UK’s territorial 
constitution. 
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